[T]here is another method of obtaining money.… [It] does not presuppose the existence of accumulated results of previous development, and hence may be considered as the only one which is available in strict logic. This method of obtaining money is the creation of purchasing power by banks. The form it takes is immaterial. The issue of banknotes not fully covered by specie withdrawn from circulation is an obvious instance, but methods of deposit banking render the same service, where they increase the sum total of possible expenditure. Or we may think of bank acceptances in so far as they serve as money to make payments in wholesale trade. It is always a question, not of transforming purchasing power which already exists in someone’s possession, but of the creation of new purchasing power out of nothing — out of nothing even if the credit contract by which the new purchasing power is created is supported by securities which are not themselves circulating media — which is added to the existing circulation. And this is the source from which new combinations are often financed, and from which they would have to be financed always, if results of previous development did not actually exist at any moment. These credit means of payment, that is means of payment which are created for the purpose and by the act of giving credit, serve just as ready money in trade, partly directly, partly because they can be converted immediately into ready money for small payments or payments to the non-banking classes — in particular to wage-earners. With their help, those who carry out new combinations can gain access to the existing stocks of productive means, or, as the case may be, enable those from whom they buy productive services to gain immediate access to the market for consumption goods. There is never, in this nexus, granting of credit in the sense that someone must wait for the equivalent of his service in goods, and content himself with a claim, thereby fulfilling a special function; not even in the sense that someone has to accumulate means of maintenance for laborers or landowners, or produced means of production, all of which would only be paid for out of the final results of production. Economically, it is true, there is an essential difference between these means of payment, if they are created for new ends, and money or other means of payment of the circular flow. The latter may be conceived on the one hand as a kind of certificate for completed production and the increase in the social product effected through it, and on the other hand as a kind of order upon, or claim to, part of this social product. The former have not the first of these two characteristics. They too are orders, for which one can immediately procure consumption goods, but not certificates for previous production. Access to the national dividend is usually to be had only on condition of some productive service previously rendered or of some product previously sold. This condition is, in this case, not yet fulfilled. It will be fulfilled only after the successful completion of the new combinations. Hence this credit will in the meantime affect the price level. The banker, therefore, is not so much primarily a middleman in the commodity “purchasing power” as a producer of this commodity. However, since all reserve funds and savings today usually flow to him, and the total demand for free purchasing power, whether existing or to be created, concentrates on him, he has either replaced private capitalists or become their agent; he has himself become the capitalist par excellence. He stands between those who wish to form new combinations and the possessors of productive means. He is essentially a phenomenon of development, though only when no central authority directs the social process. He makes possible the carrying out of new combinations, authorizes people, in the name of society as it were, to form them. He is the ephor of the exchange economy…. [Chapter II: “The Fundamental Phenomenon of Economic Development,” The Theory of Economic Development , New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993, pp. 72-74.]
Take one famous example: arguments about property destruction after Seattle. Most of these, I think, were really arguments about capitalism. Those who decried window-breaking did so mainly because they wished to appeal to middle-class consumers to move towards global exchange-style green consumerism, and to ally with labor bureaucracies and social democrats abroad. This was not a path designed to provoke a direct confrontation with capitalism, and most of those who urged us to take this route were at least skeptical about the possibility that capitalism could ever really be defeated. Many were in fact in favor of capitalism, if in a significantly humanized form. Those who did break windows, on the other hand, didn't care if they offended suburban homeowners, because they did not figure that suburban homeowners were likely to ever become a significant element in any future revolutionary anticapitalist coalition. They were trying, in effect, to hijack the media to send a message that the system was vulnerable -- hoping to inspire similar insurrectionary acts on the part of those who might be considering entering a genuinely revolutionary alliance; alienated teenagers, oppressed people of color, undocumented workers, rank-and-file laborers impatient with union bureaucrats, the homeless, the unemployed, the criminalized, the radically discontent. If a militant anticapitalist movement was to begin, in America, it would have to start with people like these: people who don't need to be convinced that the system is rotten, only, that there's something they can do about it. And at any rate, even if it were possible to have an anticapitalist revolution without gun-battles in the streets -- which most of us are hoping it is, since let's face it, if we come up against the US army, we will lose -- there's no possible way we could have an anticapitalist revolution while at the same time scrupulously respecting property rights. Yes, that will probably mean the suburban middle class will be the last to come on board. But they would probably be the last to come on board anyway.
BATTHYANY, LOUIS (LAJOS), COUNT (1806-1849), Hungarian statesman, was born at Pressburg in 1806. He supplied the defects of an indifferent education while serving in garrison in Italy as a lieutenant of hussars, and thenceforward adopted all the new ideas, economical and political. According to Széchenyi, he learnt much from a German tutor of the radical school, but it was not till after his marriage with the noble-minded and highly-gifted countess Antonia Zichy that he began working earnestly for the national cause. When Széchenyi drew nearer to the court in 1839-1840, Batthyány became the leader of the opposition in the Upper House, where his social rank and resolute character won for him great influence. Despite his "sardanapalian inclinations," he associated himself unreservedly with the extremists, and spent large sums for the development of trade and industry. In 1847 he fiercely opposed the government, procured the election of Kossuth as the representative of Pest, took part in the Great Deputation of the 15th of March, and on the 31st of March 1848 became the first constitutional prime-minister of Hungary. His position became extremely difficult when Jellachich and the Croats took up arms. Convinced that the rigid maintenance of the constitution was the sole panacea, he did his utmost, in his frequent journeys to Innsbruck, to persuade the court to condemn Jellachich and establish a strong national government at Pest. Unfortunately, however, he was persuaded to consent to the despatch of Magyar troops to quell the Italian rising, before the Croat difficulty had been adjusted, and thenceforth, despite his perfect loyalty, and his admirable services as Honvéd minister in organizing the national forces, his authority in Hungary declined before the rising star of Kossuth. When Jellachich invaded Hungary, Batthyány resigned with the intention of forming a new ministry excluding Kossuth, but this had now become impossible. Then Batthyány attempted to mediate between the two extreme parties, and subsequently raised a regiment from among his peasantry and led them against the Croats. On the 11th of October he was incapacitated for active service by a fall from his horse which broke his arm. On his recovery he returned to Pest, laboured hard to bring about peace, and was a member of the deputation from the Hungarian diet to Prince Windischgrätz, whom the Austrian commander refused to receive. A few days later (8th of January 1849) he was arrested at Pest. As a magnate he was only indictable by the grand justiciary, as a minister he was responsible to the diet alone. At Laibach, whither he was taken, he asked that Deák might be his advocate, but this being refused he wrote his own defence. Sentence of hanging was finally pronounced upon him at Olmtitz for violating the Pragmatic Sanction, overthrowing the constitution, and aiding and abetting the rebellion. To escape this fate he Stabbed himself with a small concealed dagger, and bled to death in the night of the 5th of October 1849. Entry: BATTHYANY
LEO XIII. (Gioacchino Pecci) (1810-1903), pope from 1878 to 1903, reckoned the 257th successor of St Peter, was born at Carpineto on the 2nd of March 1810. His family was Sienese in origin, and his father, Colonel Domenico Pecci, had served in the army of Napoleon. His mother, Anna Prosperi, is said to have been a descendant of Rienzi, and was a member of the third order of St Francis. He and his elder brother Giuseppe (known as Cardinal Pecci) received their earliest education from the Jesuits at Viterbo, and completed their education in Rome. In the jubilee year 1825 he was selected by his fellow-students at the Collegium Romanum to head a deputation to Pope Leo XII., whose memory he subsequently cherished and whose name he assumed in 1878. Weak health, consequent on over-study, prevented him from obtaining the highest academical honours, but he graduated as doctor in theology at the age of twenty-two, and then entered the Accademia dei Nobili ecclesiastici, a college in which clergy of aristocratic birth are trained for the diplomatic service of the Roman Church. Two years later Gregory XVI. appointed him a domestic prelate, and bestowed on him, by way of apprenticeship, various minor administrative offices. He was ordained priest on the 31st of December 1837, and a few weeks later was made apostolic delegate of the small papal territory of Benevento, where he had to deal with brigands and smugglers, who enjoyed the protection of some of the noble families of the district. His success here led to his appointment in 1841 as delegate of Perugia, which was at that time a centre of anti-papal secret societies. This post he held for eighteen months only, but in that brief period he obtained a reputation as a social and municipal reformer. In 1843 he was sent as nuncio to Brussels, being first consecrated a bishop (19th February), with the title of archbishop of Damietta. During his three years' residence at the Belgian capital he found ample scope for his gifts as a diplomatist in the education controversy then raging, and as mediator between the Jesuits and the Catholic university of Louvain. He gained the esteem of Leopold I., and was presented to Queen Victoria of England and the Prince Consort. He also made the acquaintance of many Englishmen, Archbishop Whately among them. In January 1846, at the request of the magistrates and people of Perugia, he was appointed bishop of that city with the rank of archbishop; but before returning to Italy he spent February in London, and March and April in Paris. On his arrival in Rome he would, at the request of King Leopold, have been created cardinal but for the death of Gregory XVI. Seven years later, 19th December 1853, he received the red hat from Pius IX. Meanwhile, and throughout his long episcopate of thirty-two years, he foreshadowed the zeal and the enlightened policy later to be displayed in the prolonged period of his pontificate, building and restoring many churches, striving to elevate the intellectual as well as the spiritual tone of his clergy, and showing in his pastoral letters an unusual regard for learning and for social reform. His position in Italy was similar to that of Bishop Dupanloup in France; and, as but a moderate supporter of the policy enunciated in the Syllabus, he was not altogether _persona grata_ to Pius IX. But he protested energetically against the loss of the pope's temporal power in 1870, against the confiscation of the property of the religious orders, and against the law of civil marriage established by the Italian government, and he refused to welcome Victor Emmanuel in his diocese. Nevertheless, he remained in the comparative obscurity of his episcopal see until the death of Cardinal Antonelli; but in 1877, when the important papal office of _camerlengo_ became vacant, Pius IX. appointed to it Cardinal Pecci, who thus returned to reside in Rome, with the prospect of having shortly responsible functions to perform during the vacancy of the Holy See, though the _camerlengo_ was traditionally regarded as disqualified by his office from succeeding to the papal throne. Entry: LEO
Their situation was so dangerous just because it combined inward debility and outward pressure, both tending to the same result, viz. practical disuse of the distinctively Christian means of grace, as compared with those recognized by Judaism, and such conformity to the latter as would make the reproach of the Cross to cease (xiii. 13, cf. xi. 26). This might, indeed, relieve the external strain of the contest ([Greek: agôn] xii. 1), which had become well-nigh intolerable to them. But the practical surrender of what was distinctive in their new faith meant a theoretic surrender of the value once placed on that element, when it was matter of a living religious experience far in advance of what Judaism had given them (vi. 4 [ff]., x. 26-29). This twofold infidelity, in thought and deed, God, the "living" God of progress from the "shadow" to the substance, would require at their hands (x. 30 f., xii. 22-29). For it meant turning away from an appeal that had been known as "heavenly," for something inferior and earthly (xii. 25); from a call sanctioned by the incomparable authority of Him in whom it had reached men, a greater than Moses and all media of the Old Covenant, even the Son of God. Thus the key of the whole exhortation is struck in the opening words, which contrast the piecemeal revelation "to the fathers" in the past, with the complete and final revelation to themselves in the last stage of the existing order of the world's history, in a Son of transcendent dignity (i. 1 ff., cf. ii. 1 ff., x. 28 f., xii. 18 ff.). This goes to the root of their difficulty, ambiguity as to the relation of the old and the new elements in Judaeo-Christian piety, so that there was constant danger of the old overshadowing the new, since national Judaism remained hostile. At a stroke the author separates the new from the old, as belonging to a new "covenant" or order of God's revealed will. It is a confusion, resulting in loss, not in gain, as regards spiritual power, to try to combine the two types of piety, as his readers were more and more apt to do. There is _no use_, religiously, in falling back upon the old forms, in order to avoid the social penalties of a sectarian position within Judaism, when the secret of religious "perfection" or maturity (vi. 1, cf. the frequent use of the kindred verb) lies elsewhere. Hence the moral of his whole argument as to the two covenants, though it is formulated only incidentally amid final detailed counsels (xiii. 13 f.) is to leave Judaism, and adopt a frankly Christian standing, on the same footing with their non-Jewish brethren in the local church. For this the time was now ripe; and in it lay the true path of safety--eternal safety as before God, whatever man might say or do (xiii. 5 f.). Entry: 3
The first Cuban congress met on the 5th of May 1902, prepared to take over the government from the American military authorities, which it did on the 20th of May. Tomas Estrada Palma (1835-1908) became the first president of the Republic. In material prosperity the progress of the island from 1902 to 1906 was very great; but in its politics, various social and economic elements, and political habits and examples of Spanish provenience that ill befit a democracy, led once more to revolution. Congress neglected to pass certain laws which were required by the constitution, and which, as regards municipal autonomy, independence of the judiciary, and congressional representation of minority parties, were intended to make impossible the abuses of centralized government that had characterized Spanish administration. Political parties were forming without very evident basis for differences outside questions of political patronage and the good or ill use of power; and, in the absence of the laws just mentioned, the Moderates, being in power, used every instrument of government to strengthen their hold on office. The preliminaries of the elections of December 1905 and March 1906 being marked by frauds and injustice, the Liberals deserted the polls at those elections, and instead of appealing to judicial tribunals controlled by the Moderates, issued a manifesto of revolution on the 28th of July 1906.[3] This insurrection rapidly assumed large proportions. The government was weak and lacked moral support in the whole island. After repeated petitions from President Palma for intervention by the United States, commissioners (William H. Taft, Secretary of War, and Robert Bacon, Acting Secretary of State) were sent from Washington to act as peace mediators. Entry: A
It is difficult to summarize Baader's philosophy, for he himself generally gave expression to his deepest thoughts in obscure aphorisms, or mystical symbols and analogies (see Ed. Zeller's _Ges. d. deut. Phil._ 732, 736). Further, he has no systematic works; his doctrines exist for the most part in short detached essays, in comments on the writings of Boehme and Saint Martin, or in his extensive correspondence and journals. At the same time there are salient points which mark the outline of his thought. Baader starts from the position that human reason by itself can never reach the end it aims at, and maintains that we cannot throw aside the presuppositions of faith, church and tradition. His point of view may be described as Scholasticism; for, like the scholastic doctors, he believes that theology and philosophy are not opposed sciences, but that reason has to make clear the truths given by authority and revelation. But in his attempt to draw still closer the realms of faith and knowledge he approaches more nearly to the mysticism of Eckhart, Paracelsus and Boehme. Our existence depends on the fact that we are cognized by God (_cogitor ergo cogito et sum_). All self-consciousness is at the same time God-consciousness; our knowledge is never mere _scientia_, it is invariably _con-scientia_--a knowing with, consciousness of, or participation in God. Baader's philosophy is thus essentially a theosophy. God is not to be conceived as mere abstract Being (_substantia_), but as everlasting process, activity (_actus_). Of this process, this self-generation of God, we may distinguish two aspects--the immanent or esoteric, and the emanent or exoteric. God has reality only in so far as He is absolute spirit, and only in so far as the primitive will is conscious of itself can it become spirit at all. But in this very cognition of self is involved the distinction of knower and known, from which proceeds the power to become spirit. This immanent process of self-consciousness, wherein indeed a trinity of persons is not given but only rendered possible, is mirrored in, and takes place through, the eternal and impersonal idea or wisdom of God, which exists beside, though not distinct from, the primitive will. Concrete reality or personality is given to this divine _Ternar_, as Baader calls it, through _nature_, the principle of self-hood, of individual being, which is eternally and necessarily produced by God. Only in nature is the trinity of _persons_ attained. These processes, it must be noticed, are not to be conceived as successive, or as taking place in time; they are to be looked at _sub specie aeternitatis_, as the necessary elements or moments in the self-evolution of the divine Being. Nor is _nature_ to be confounded with created substance, or with matter as it exists in space and time; it is pure non-being, the mere otherness (_alteritas_) of God-his shadow, desire, want, or _desiderium sui_, as it is called by mystical writers. Creation, itself a free and non-temporal act of God's love and will, cannot be speculatively deduced, but must be accepted as an historic [v.03 p.0088] fact. Created beings were originally of three orders--the intelligent or angels; the non-intelligent natural existences; and man, who mediated between these two orders. Intelligent beings are endowed with freedom; it is possible, but not necessary, that they should fall. Hence the fact of the fall is not a speculative but an historic truth. The angels fell through pride--through desire to raise themselves to equality with God; man fell by lowering himself to the level of nature. Only after the fall of man begins the creation of space, time and matter, or of the world as we now know it; and the motive of this creation was the desire to afford man an opportunity for taking advantage of the scheme of redemption, for bringing forth in purity the image of God according to which he has been fashioned. The physical philosophy and anthropology which Baader, in connexion with this, unfolds in various works, is but little instructive, and coincides in the main with the utterances of Boehme. In nature and in man he finds traces of the dire effects of sin, which has corrupted both and has destroyed their natural harmony. As regards ethics, Baader rejects the Kantian or any autonomic system of morals. Not obedience to a moral law, but realization in ourselves of the divine life is the true ethical end. But man has lost the power to effect this by himself; he has alienated himself from God, and therefore no ethical theory which neglects the facts of sin and redemption is satisfactory or even possible. The history of man and of humanity is the history of the redeeming love of God. The means whereby we put ourselves so in relation with Christ as to receive from Him his healing virtue are chiefly prayer and the sacraments of the church; mere works are never sufficient. Man in his social relations is under two great institutions. One is temporal, natural and limited--the state; the other is eternal, cosmopolitan and universal--the church. In the state two things are requisite: first, common submission to the ruler, which can be secured or given only when the state is Christian, for God alone is the true ruler of men; and, secondly, inequality of rank, without which there can be no organization. A despotism of mere power and liberalism, which naturally produces socialism, are equally objectionable. The ideal state is a civil community ruled by a universal or Catholic church, the principles of which are equally distinct from mere passive pietism, or faith which will know nothing, and from the Protestant doctrine, which is the very radicalism of reason. Entry: BAADER
The character of the art-teaching adopted in any country must of course depend upon the dominant conception of art and its function and purpose. If we regard it as an idle accomplishment for the leisured few, its methods will be amateurish and superficial. If we regard art as an important factor in education, as a language of the intelligence, as an indispensable companion to literature, we shall favour systematic study and a training in the power of direct expression by means of line. We shall value the symbolic drawing of early civilizations like the Egyptian, and symbolic art generally, and in the history of decorative art we shall find the true accompaniment and illustration of human history itself. From this point of view we shall value the acquisition of the power of drawing for the purpose of presenting and explaining the facts and forms of nature. Drawing will be the most direct means at the command of the teacher to explain, to expound, to demonstrate where mere words are not sufficiently definite or explicit. Drawing in this sense is taking a more important place in education, especially in primary education, though there is no need for it to stop there, and one feels it may be destined to take a more important position both as a training for the eye and hand and an aid to the teacher. Then, again, we may regard art more from its social aspect as an essential accompaniment of human life, not only for its illustrative and depicting powers, but also and no less for its pleasure-giving properties, its power of awakening and stimulating the observation and sympathy with the moods of nature, its power of touching the emotions, and above all of appealing to our sense of beauty. We shall regard the study of art from this point of view as the greatest civilizer, the most permeating of social and human forces. Such ideas as these, shared no doubt by all who take pleasure and interest in art, or feel it to be an important element in their lives, are crossed and often obscured by a multitude of mundane considerations, and it is probably out of the struggle for ascendancy between these that our systems of art teaching are evolved. There is the demand of the right to live on the part of the artist and the teacher of art. There is the demand on the part of the manufacturer and salesman for such art as will help him to dispose of his goods. In the present commercial rivalry between nations this latter demand is brought into prominent relief, and art is apt to be made a minister, or perhaps a slave to the market. These are but accidental relationships with art. All who care for art value it as a means of expression, and for the pleasure and beauty it infuses into all it touches, or as essential and inseparable from life itself. Seeing then the importance of art from any point of view, individual, social, commercial, intellectual, emotional, economic, it should be important to us in our systems of art-teaching not to lose sight of the end in arranging the means--not to allow our teaching to be dominated by either dilettantism or commercialism, neither to be feeble for want of technical skill, nor to sacrifice everything to technique. The true object of art-teaching is very much like that of all education--to inform the mind, while you give skill to the hand--not to impose certain rigid rules, or fixed recipes and methods of work, but while giving instruction in definite methods and the use of materials, to allow for the individual development of the student and enable him to acquire the power to express himself through different media without forgetting the grammar and alphabet of design. Practice may vary, but principles remain, and there is a certain logic in art, as well as in reasoning. All art is conditioned in the mode of its expression by its material, and even the most individual kind of art has a convention of its own by the very necessities and means of its existence. Methods of expression, conventions alter as each artist, each age seeks some new interpretation of nature and the imagination--the well-springs of artistic life, and from these reviving streams continually flow new harmonies, new inventions and recombinations, taking form and colour according to the temperaments which give them birth. (W. Cr.) Entry: A