Quotes4study

When he reached home Prince Andrew began thinking of his life in Petersburg during those last four months as if it were something new. He recalled his exertions and solicitations, and the history of his project of army reform, which had been accepted for consideration and which they were trying to pass over in silence simply because another, a very poor one, had already been prepared and submitted to the Emperor. He thought of the meetings of a committee of which Berg was a member. He remembered how carefully and at what length everything relating to form and procedure was discussed at those meetings, and how sedulously and promptly all that related to the gist of the business was evaded. He recalled his labors on the Legal Code, and how painstakingly he had translated the articles of the Roman and French codes into Russian, and he felt ashamed of himself. Then he vividly pictured to himself Bogucharovo, his occupations in the country, his journey to Ryazan; he remembered the peasants and Dron the village elder, and mentally applying to them the Personal Rights he had divided into paragraphs, he felt astonished that he could have spent so much time on such useless work.

Leo Tolstoy     War and Peace

"If this law were adopted, sir," said the procureur, "it would greatly simplify our legal codes, and in that case the magistrates would not (as you just observed) have much to do."

Alexandre Dumas, Pere     The Count of Monte Cristo

On these three considerations alone is based the conception of irresponsibility for crimes and the extenuating circumstances admitted by all legislative codes. The responsibility appears greater or less according to our greater or lesser knowledge of the circumstances in which the man was placed whose action is being judged, and according to the greater or lesser interval of time between the commission of the action and its investigation, and according to the greater or lesser understanding of the causes that led to the action.

Leo Tolstoy     War and Peace

"I agree with you entirely, sir; but all that even you know with respect to the French code, I know, not only in reference to that code, but as regards the codes of all nations. The English, Turkish, Japanese, Hindu laws, are as familiar to me as the French laws, and thus I was right, when I said to you, that relatively (you know that everything is relative, sir)--that relatively to what I have done, you have very little to do; but that relatively to all I have learned, you have yet a great deal to learn."

Alexandre Dumas, Pere     The Count of Monte Cristo

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Fyodor Dostoyevsky     The Brothers Karamazov

On that first evening Bolkonski spent with him, having mentioned the Commission for the Revision of the Code of Laws, Speranski told him sarcastically that the Commission had existed for a hundred and fifty years, had cost millions, and had done nothing except that Rosenkampf had stuck labels on the corresponding paragraphs of the different codes.

Leo Tolstoy     War and Peace

"In the meanwhile," continued the magistrate, "our codes are in full force, with all their contradictory enactments derived from Gallic customs, Roman laws, and Frank usages; the knowledge of all which, you will agree, is not to be acquired without extended labor; it needs tedious study to acquire this knowledge, and, when acquired, a strong power of brain to retain it."

Alexandre Dumas, Pere     The Count of Monte Cristo

The 12th century saw many remarkable writers, mostly in Cilician Armenia, viz. Nerses the Graceful (d. 1165), author of an *_Elegy_ on the taking of Edessa, of *voluminous hymns, of long *Pastoral Letters and Synodal orations of value for the historian of eastern churches. *Samuel of Ani composed a chronicle up to 1179. Nerses of Lambron, archbishop of Tarsus, left a *Synodal oration, a *Commentary on the liturgy, &c., and his contemporary Gregory of Tlay an *_Elegy_ on the capture of Jerusalem, and various *dogmatic works. In this century the *history of Michael the Syrian was translated; Ignatius and Sargis composed *commentaries on Luke and *the catholic epistles, and *Matthew of Edessa a valuable history of the years 952-1136, continued up to 1176 by Gregory the priest. Mechithar (Mekhitar) Kosh (d. 1207) wrote an elegant *_Book of Fables_, and compiled a *corpus of civil and canon law (partly from Byzantine codes). Entry: A

Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, Volume 2, Slice 5 "Arculf" to "Armour, Philip"     1910-1911

The proposer of a contract can prescribe or authorize any mode, or at least any reasonable mode, of acceptance, and if he specifies none he is deemed to authorize the use of any reasonable mode in common use, and especially the post. Acceptance in words is not always required; an offer may be well accepted by an act clearly referable to the proposed agreement, and constituting the whole or part of the performance asked for--say the despatch of goods in answer to an order by post, or the doing of work bespoken; and it seems that in such cases further communication--unless expressly requested--is not necessary as matter of law, however prudent and desirable it may be. Where a promise and not an act is sought (as where a tradesman writes a letter offering goods for sale on credit), it must be communicated; in the absence of special direction letter post or telegraph may be used; and, further, the acceptor having done his part when his answer is committed to the post. English courts now hold (after much discussion and doubt) that any delay or miscarriage in course of post is at the proposer's risk, so that a man may be bound by an acceptance he never received. It is generally thought--though there is no English decision--that, in conformity with this last rule, a revocation by telegraph of an acceptance already posted would be inoperative. Much more elaborate rules are laid down in some continental codes. It seems doubtful whether their complication achieves any gain of substantial justice worth the price. At first sight it looks easy to solve some of the difficulties by admitting an interval during which one party is bound and the other not. But, apart from the risk of starting fresh problems as hard as the old ones, English principles, as above said, require a contract to be concluded between the parties at one point of time, and any exception to this would have to be justified by very strong grounds of expediency. We have already assumed, but it should be specifically stated, that neither offers nor acceptances are confined to communications made in spoken or written words. Acts or signs may and constantly do signify proposal and assent. One does not in terms request a ferryman to put one across the river. Stepping into the boat is an offer to pay the usual fare for being ferried over, and the ferryman accepts it by putting off. This is a very simple case, but the principle is the same in all cases. Acts fitted to convey to a reasonable man the proposal of an agreement, or the acceptance of a proposal he has made, are as good in law as equivalent express words. The term "implied contract" is current in this connexion, but it is unfortunately ambiguous. It sometimes means a contract concluded by acts, not words, of one or both parties, but still a real agreement; sometimes an obligation imposed by law where there is not any agreement in fact, for which the name "quasi-contract" is more appropriate and now usual. Entry: CONTRACT

Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, Volume 7, Slice 2 "Constantine Pavlovich" to "Convention"     1910-1911

A person liable as a surety for another under a guarantee possesses various rights against him, against the person to whom the guarantee is given, and also against those who may have become co-sureties in respect of the same debt, default or miscarriage. As regards the surety's rights against the principal debtor, the latter may, where the guarantee was made with his consent but not otherwise (see _Hodgson_ v. _Shaw_, 3 Myl. & K. at p. 190), after he has made default, be compelled by the surety to exonerate him from liability by payment of the guaranteed debt (_per_ Sir W. Grant, M.R., in _Antrobus_ v. _Davidson_, 3 Meriv. 569, 579; _per_ Lindley, L.J., in _Johnston_ v. _Salvage Association_, 19 Q.B.D. 460, 461; and see _Wolmershausen_ v. _Gullick_, 1893, 2 Ch. 514). The moment, moreover, the surety has himself paid any portion of the guaranteed debt, he is entitled to rank as a creditor for the amount so paid, and to compel repayment thereof. In the event of the principal debtor's bankruptcy, the surety can in England, if the creditor has not already proved in respect of the guaranteed debt, prove against the bankrupt's estate, not only in respect of payments made before the bankruptcy of the principal debtor, but also, it seems, in respect of the contingent liability to pay under the guarantee (see _Ex parte Delmar re Herepath_, 1889, 38 W.R. 752), while if the creditor has already proved, the surety who has paid the guaranteed debt has a right to all dividends received by the creditor from the bankrupt in respect thereof, and to stand in the creditor's place as to future dividends. This right is, however, often waived by the guarantee stipulating that, until the creditor has received full payment of all sums over and above the guaranteed debt, due to him from the principal debtor, the surety shall not participate in any dividends distributed from the bankrupt's estate amongst his creditors. As regards the rights of the surety against the creditor, they are in England exercisable even by one who in the first instance was a principal debtor, but has since become a surety, by arrangement with his creditor, duly notified to the creditor, though not even sanctioned by him. This was decided by the House of Lords in the case of _Rouse_ v. _The Bradford Banking Co._, 1894, A.C. 586, removing a doubt created by the previous case of _Swire_ v. _Redman_, 1 Q.B.D. 536, which must now be treated as overruled. The surety's principal right against the creditor entitles him, after payment of the guaranteed debt, to the benefit of all securities, whether known to him (the surety) or not, which the creditor held against the principal debtor; and where, by default or _laches_ of the creditor, such securities have been lost, or rendered otherwise unavailable, the surety is discharged _pro tanto_. This right, which is _not_ in abeyance till the surety is called on to pay (_Dixon_ v. _Steel_, 1901, 2 Ch. 602), extends to all securities, whether satisfied or not, given before or after the contract of suretyship was entered into. On this subject the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, § 5, provides that "every person who being surety for the debt or duty of another, or being liable with another for any debt or duty, shall pay such debt or perform such duty, shall be entitled to have assigned to him, or to a trustee for him, every judgment, specialty, or other security, which shall be held by the creditor in respect of such debt or duty, whether such judgment, specialty, or other security shall or shall not be deemed at law to have been satisfied by the payment of the debt or performance of the duty, and such person shall be entitled to stand in the place of the creditor, and to use all the remedies, and, if need be, and upon a proper indemnity, to use the name of the creditor, in any action or other proceeding at law or in equity, in order to obtain from the principal debtor, or any co-surety, co-contractor, or co-debtor, as the case may be, indemnification for the advances made and loss sustained by the person who shall have so paid such debt or performed such duty; and such payment or performance so made by such surety shall not be pleadable in bar of any such action or other proceeding by him, provided always that no co-surety, co-contractor, or co-debtor shall be entitled to recover from any other co-surety, co-contractor, or co-debtor, by the means aforesaid, more than the just proportion to which, as between those parties themselves, such last-mentioned person shall be justly liable." This enactment is so far retrospective that it applies to a contract made before the act, where the breach thereof, and the payment by the surety, have taken place subsequently. The right of the surety to be subrogated, on payment by him of the guaranteed debt, to all the rights of the creditor against the principal debtor is recognized in America (_Tobin_ v. _Kirk_, 80 New York S.C.R. 229), and many other countries (Codes Civil, Fr. and Bel. 2029; Spain, 1839; Port. 839; Germany, 774; Holland, 1877; Italy, 1916; Lower Canada, 2959; Egypt [mixed suits], 617; _ibid._ [native tribunals], 505). Entry: A

Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, Volume 12, Slice 6 "Groups, Theory of" to "Gwyniad"     1910-1911

The law of Scotland as to fixtures is the same as that of England. The Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Acts 1883 (ss. 35, 42) and 1900 (as to market gardens) give a similar statutory right of removal. The law of Ireland has been the subject of the special legislation sketched in the article LANDLORD AND TENANT. The French Code Civil recognizes the right of the usufructuary to remove articles attached by him to the subject of his estate on the expiry of his term, on making good the place from which they were taken (Art. 599); and there are similar provisions in the Civil Codes of Italy (Art. 495), Spain (Arts. 487, 489), Portugal (Art. 2217) and Germany (Arts. 1037, 1049). Entry: 4

Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, Volume 10, Slice 4 "Finland" to "Fleury, Andre"     1910-1911

4. _The Future Codification._--Neither Clement VIII. nor, at a later date, Benedict XIV., could have dreamt of the radical reform at present in course of execution. Instead of accumulating the texts of the laws in successive collections, it is proposed entirely to recast the system of editing them. This codification in a series of short articles was suggested by the example of the French codes, the history of which during the 19th century is well known. From all quarters the Catholic episcopate had submitted to the Vatican council petitions in this sense. "It is absolutely clear," said some French bishops, "and has for a long time past been universally acknowledged and asserted, that a revision and reform of the canon law is necessary and most urgent. As matters now stand, in consequence of the many and grave changes in human affairs and in society, many laws have become useless, others difficult or impossible to obey. With regard to a great number of canons, it is a matter of dispute whether they are still in force or are abrogated. Finally, in the course of so many centuries, the number of ecclesiastical laws has increased to such an extent, and these laws have accumulated in such immense collections, that in a certain sense we can well say: We are crushed beneath the laws, _obruimur legibus_. Hence arise infinite and inextricable difficulties which obstruct the study of canon law; an immense field for controversy and litigation; a thousand perplexities of conscience; and finally contempt for the laws."[36] We know how the Vatican council had to separate without approaching the question of canonical reform; but this general desire for a recasting of the ecclesiastical code was taken up again on the initiative of Rome. On the 19th of March 1904, Pius X. published a _Motu proprio, "de ecclesiae legibus in unum redigendis_." After briefly reviewing the present condition of the canonical texts and collections, he pointed out its inconvenience, referred to the many requests from the episcopate, and decreed the preparation of a general code of canon law. This immense undertaking involved the codification of the entire canon law, drawing it up in a clear, short and precise form, and introducing any expedient modifications and reforms. For this purpose the pope appointed a commission of cardinals, of which he himself became president; also a commission of "consultors" resident at Rome, which asked for a certain amount of assistance from canonists at various universities and seminaries. Further, the assembled bishops of each province were invited to give their opinion as to the points in which they considered the canon law might profitably be modified or abrogated. Two consultors had the duty of separately drawing up a preliminary plan for each title, these projects being twice submitted for the deliberation of the commission (or sub-commission) of consultors, the version adopted by them being next submitted to the commission of cardinals, and the whole finally sent up for the papal sanction. These commissions started work at the end of 1904. Entry: 4

Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, Volume 5, Slice 2 "Camorra" to "Cape Colony"     1910-1911

6. The necessity of employing more stringent standards of criticisms and more exact methods is now recognized, and it is characteristic that the foremost contemporary representative of comparative jurisprudence, Joseph Kohler of Berlin, principal editor of the _Zeitschrift für vgl. Rechtswissenschaft_, often gives expression to this view. Beginning with studies of procedure and private law in the provinces of Germany where the French law of the Code Napoléon was still applied, he has thrown his whole energy into monographic surveys and investigations in all the departments of historical and ethnological jurisprudence. The code of Khammurabi and the Babylonian contracts, the ancient Hindu codes and juridical commentaries on them, the legal customs of the different tribes and provinces of India, the collection and sifting of the legal customs of aborigines in the German colonies in Africa, the materials supplied by investigators of Australian and American tribes, the history of legal customs of the Mahommedans, and numberless other points of ethnological research, have been treated by him in articles in his _Zeitschrift_ and in other publications. Comprehensive attempts have also been made by him at a synthetic treatment of certain sides of the law--like the law of debt in his _Shakespeare vor dem Forum der Jurisprudenz_ (1883) or his _Primitive History of Marriage_. Undoubtedly we have not to deal in this case with mere accumulation of material or with remarks on casual analogies. And yet the importance of these works consists mainly in their extensive range of observation. The critical side is still on the second plane, although not conspicuously absent as in the case of Post and some of his followers. We may sympathize cordially with Kohler's exhortation to work for a universal history of law without yet perceiving clearly what the stages of this universal history are going to be. We may acknowledge the enormous importance of Morgan's and Bachofen's discoveries without feeling bound to recognize that all tribes and nations of the earth have gone substantially through the same forms of development in respect of marriage custom, and without admitting that the evidence for a universal spread of group-marriage has been produced. Altogether the reproach seems not entirely unfounded that investigations of this kind are carried on too much under the sway of a preconceived notion that some highly peculiar arrangement entirely different from what we are practising nowadays--say sexual promiscuity or communism in the treatment of property--must be made out as a universal clue to earlier stages of development. Kohler's occasional remarks on matters of method (e.g. _Zeitschift für vgl. Rechtswissenschaft_, xii. 193 seq.) seem hardly adequate to dispel this impression. But in his own work and in that of some of his compeers and followers, J. E. Hitzig, Hellwig, Max Huber, R. Dareste, more exact forms and means of inquiry are gradually put into practice, and the results testify to a distinct heightening of the scientific standard in this group of studies on comparative jurisprudence. Especially conspicuous in this respect are three tendencies: (a) the growing disinclination to accept superficial analysis between phenomena belonging to widely different spheres of culture as necessarily produced by identical causes (e.g. Darinsky's review of Kovalevsky's assumptions as to group marriage among the Caucasian tribes, _Z. für vgl. Rw._, xiv. 151 seq.); (b) the selection of definite historical or ethnological territories for monographic inquiries, in the course of which arrangements observed elsewhere are treated as suggestive material for supplying gaps and starting possible explanations: Kohler's own contributions have been mainly of this kind; (c) the treatment of selected subjects by an intensive legal analysis, bringing out the principles underlying one or the other rule, its possible differentiation, the means of its application in practice, &c.: Hellwig's monograph on the right of sanctuary in savage communities (_Das Asylrecht der Naturvölker_) may be named in illustration of this analytical tendency. Altogether, there can be no doubt that the stage has been reached by comparative jurisprudence when, after a hasty, one might almost say a voracious consumption of materials, investigators begin to strive towards careful sifting of evidence and a conscious examination of methods and critical rules which have to be followed in order to make the investigations undertaken in this line worthy of their scientific aims. Until the latter has been done many students, whose trend of thought would seem to lead them naturally into this domain, may be repelled by the uncritical indistinctness with which mere analogies are treated as elusive proofs by some of the representatives of the comparative school. F. W. Maitland, for instance, was always kept back by such considerations. Entry: 6

Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, Volume 15, Slice 5 "Joints" to "Justinian I."     1910-1911