A CODE OF ETHICAL BEHAVIOR FOR PATIENTS: 1. DO NOT EXPECT YOUR DOCTOR TO SHARE YOUR DISCOMFORT. Involvement with the patient's suffering might cause him to lose valuable scientific objectivity. 2. BE CHEERFUL AT ALL TIMES. Your doctor leads a busy and trying life and requires all the gentleness and reassurance he can get. 3. TRY TO SUFFER FROM THE DISEASE FOR WHICH YOU ARE BEING TREATED. Remember that your doctor has a professional reputation to uphold.
The deeper aspects of Berkeley's new thought have been almost universally neglected or misunderstood. Of his spiritual empiricism one side only has been accepted by later thinkers, and looked upon as the whole. The subjective mechanism of association which with Berkeley is but part of the true explanation, and is dependent on the objective realization in the divine mind, has been received as in itself a satisfactory theory. _Suni Cogitationes_ has been regarded by thinkers who profess themselves Berkeleians as the one proposition warranted by consciousness; the empiricism of his philosophy has been eagerly welcomed, while the spiritual intuition, without which the whole is to Berkeley meaningless, has been cast aside. For this he is himself in no small measure to blame. The deeper spiritual intuition, present from the first, was only brought into clear relief in order to meet difficulties in the earlier statements, and the extension of the intuition itself beyond the limits of our own consciousness, which completely removes his position from mere subjectivism, rests on foundations uncritically assumed, and at first sight irreconcilable with certain positions of his system. The necessity and universality of the judgments of causality and substantiality are taken for granted; and there is no investigation of the place held by these notions in the mental constitution. The relation between the divine mind and finite intelligence, at first thought as that of agent and recipient, is complicated and obscure when the necessity for explaining the permanence of real things comes forward. The divine archetypes, according to which sensible experience is regulated and in which it finds its real objectivity, are different in kind from mere sense ideas, and the question then arises whether in these we have not again the "things as they are," which Berkeley at first so contemptuously dismissed. He leaves it undetermined whether or not our knowledge of sense things, which is never entirely presentative, involves some reference to this objective course of nature or thought of the divine mind. And if so, what is the nature of the notions necessarily implied in the simplest knowledge of a _thing_, as distinct from mere sense feeling? That in knowing objects certain thoughts are implied which are not presentations or their copies is at times dimly seen by Berkeley himself; but he was content to propound a question with regard to those notions, and to look upon them as merely Locke's ideas of relation. Such ideas of relation are in truth the stumbling-block in Locke's philosophy, and Berkeley's empiricism is equally far from accounting for them. Entry: BERKELEY
Aristotle would assign to Socrates the elaboration of two logical functions:--general definition and inductive method.[6] Rightly, if we add that he gives no theory of either, and that his practical use of the latter depends for its value on selection.[7] It is rather in virtue of his general faith in the possibility of construction, which he still does not undertake, and because of his consequent insistence on the elucidation of general concepts, which in common with some of his contemporaries, he may have thought of as endued with a certain objectivity, that he induces the controversies of what are called the Socratic schools as to the nature of predication. These result in the formulation of a new dialectic or logic by Plato. Manifestly Socrates' use of certain forms of argumentation, like their abuse by the sophists, tended to evoke their logical analysis. The use and abuse, confronted one with the other, could not but evoke it. Entry: A
There was considerable controversy in the early church as to the validity of heretical baptism. As even "the Christian virtues of the heretics were described as hypocrisy and love of ostentation," so no value whatever was attached by the orthodox party to the sacraments performed by heretics. Tertullian declares that the church can have no communion with the heretics, for there is nothing common; as they have not the same God, and the same Christ, so they have not the same baptism (_De bapt._ 15). Cyprian agreed with him. The validity of heretical baptism was denied by the church of Asia Minor as well as of Africa; but the practice of the Roman Church was to admit without second baptism heretics who had been baptized with the name of Christ, or of the Holy Trinity. Stephen of Rome attempted to force the Roman practice on the whole church in 253. The controversy his intolerance provoked was closed by Augustine's controversial treatise _De Baptismo_, in which the validity of baptism administered by heretics is based on the objectivity of the sacrament. Whenever the name of the three-one God is used, the sacrament is declared valid by whomsoever it may be performed. This was a triumph of sacramentarianism, not of charity. Entry: A
GRAETZ, HEINRICH (1817-1891), the foremost Jewish historian of modern times, was born in Posen in 1817 and died at Munich in 1891. He received a desultory education, and was largely self-taught. An important stage in his development was the period of three years that he spent at Oldenburg as assistant and pupil of S. R. Hirsch, whose enlightened orthodoxy was for a time very attractive to Graetz. Later on Graetz proceeded to Breslau, where he matriculated in 1842. Breslau was then becoming the headquarters of Abraham Geiger, the leader of Jewish reform. Graetz was repelled by Geiger's attitude, and though he subsequently took radical views of the Bible and tradition (which made him an opponent of Hirsch), Graetz remained a life-long foe to reform. He contended for freedom of thought; he had no desire to fight for freedom of ritual practice. He momentarily thought of entering the rabbinate, but he was unsuited to that career. For some years he supported himself as a tutor. He had previously won repute by his published essays, but in 1853 the publication of the fourth volume of his history of the Jews made him famous. This fourth volume (the first to be published) dealt with the Talmud. It was a brilliant resuscitation of the past. Graetz's skill in piecing together detached fragments of information, his vast learning and extraordinary critical acumen, were equalled by his vivid power of presenting personalities. No Jewish book of the 19th century produced such a sensation as this, and Graetz won at a bound the position he still occupies as recognized master of Jewish history. His _Geschichte der Juden_, begun in 1853, was completed in 1875; new editions of the several volumes were frequent. The work has been translated into many languages; it appeared in English in five volumes in 1891-1895. The _History_ is defective in its lack of objectivity; Graetz's judgments are sometimes biassed, and in particular he lacks sympathy with mysticism. But the history is a work of genius. Simultaneously with the publication of vol. iv. Graetz was appointed on the staff of the new Breslau Seminary, of which the first director was Z. Frankel. Graetz passed the remainder of his life in this office; in 1869 he was created professor by the government, and also lectured at the Breslau University. Graetz attained considerable repute as a biblical critic. He was the author of many bold conjectures as to the date of Ruth, Ecclesiastes, Esther and other biblical books. His critical edition of the Psalms (1882-1883) was his chief contribution to biblical exegesis, but after his death Professor Bacher edited Graetz's _Emendationes_ to many parts of the Hebrew scriptures. Entry: GRAETZ
GEIBEL, EMANUEL (1815-1884), German poet, was born at Lübeck on the 17th of October 1815, the son of a pastor in the city. He was originally intended for his father's profession, and studied at Bonn and Berlin, but his real interests lay not in theology but in classical and romance philology. In 1838 he accepted a tutorship at Athens, where he remained until 1840. In the same year he brought out, in conjunction with his friend Ernst Curtius, a volume of translations from the Greek. His first poems, _Zeitstimmen_, appeared in 1841; a tragedy, _König Roderich_, followed in 1843. In the same year he received a pension from the king of Prussia, which he retained until his invitation to Munich by the king of Bavaria in 1851 as honorary professor at the university. In the interim he had produced _König Sigurds Brautfahrt_ (1846), an epic, and _Juniuslieder_ (1848, 33rd ed. 1901), lyrics in a more spirited and manlier style than his early poems. A volume of _Neue Gedichte_, published at Munich in 1857, and principally consisting of poems on classical subjects, denoted a further considerable advance in objectivity, and the series was worthily closed by the _Spätherbstblätter_, published in 1877. He had quitted Munich in 1869 and returned to Lübeck, where he died on the 6th of April 1884. His works further include two tragedies, _Brunhild_ (1858, 5th ed. 1890), and _Sophonisbe_ (1869), and translations of French and Spanish popular poetry. Beginning as a member of the group of political poets who heralded the revolution of 1848, Geibel was also the chief poet to welcome the establishment of the Empire in 1871. His strength lay not, however, in his political songs but in his purely lyric poetry, such as the fine cycle _Ada_ and his still popular love-songs. He may be regarded as the leading representative of German lyric poetry between 1848 and 1870. Entry: GEIBEL
With Lotze the ideal that at last the forms of thought shall be realized to be adequate to that which at any stage of actual knowledge always proves relatively intractable is an illuminating projection of faith. He takes courage from the reflection that to accept scepticism is to presume the competence of the thought that accepts. He will, however, take no easy way of parallelism. Our human thought pursues devious and circuitous methods. Its forms are not unseldom scaffolding for the house of knowledge rather than the framework of the house itself. Our task is not to realise correspondence with something other than thought, but to make explicit those justificatory notions which condition the form of our apprehension. "However much we may presuppose an original reference of the forms of thought to that nature of things which is the goal of knowledge, we must be prepared to find in them many elements which do not directly reproduce the actual reality to the knowledge of which they are to lead us."[139] The impulse of thought to reduce coincidence to coherence reaches immediately only to objectivity or validity. The sense in which the presupposition of a further reference is to be interpreted and in which justificatory notions for it can be adduced is only determinable in a philosophic system as a whole, where feeling has a place as well as thought, value equally with validity. Entry: A
The first _Parnasse_ had been projected by MM. Xavier de Ricard (b. 1843) and Catulle Mendès (1841-1909) as a sort of manifesto of a school of young poets: but its contents were largely coloured by the inclusion among them of work by representatives of older generations--Gautier, Laprade, Leconte de Lisle, Banville, Baudelaire and others. The continuation, however, of the title in the later issues, rather than anything else, led to the formation and promulgation of the idea of a "Parnassien" or an "Impassible" school which was supposed to adopt as its watchword the motto of "Art for Art's sake," to pay especial attention to form, and also to aim at a certain objectivity. As a matter of fact the greater poets and the greater poems of the Parnasse admit of no such restrictive labelling, which can only be regarded as mischievous, though (or very mainly because) it has been continued. Another school, arising mainly in the later 'eighties and calling itself that of "Symbolism," has been supposed to indicate a reaction against Parnassianism and even against the main or Hugonic Romantic tradition generally; with a throwing back to Lamartine and perhaps Chénier. This idea of successive schools ("Decadents," "Naturists," "Simplists," &c.) has even been reduced to such an _absurdum_ as the statement that "France sees a new school of poetry every fifteen years." Those who have studied literature sufficiently widely, and from a sufficient elevation, know that these systematisings are always more or less delusive. Parnassianism, symbolism and the other things are merely phases of the Romantic movement itself--as may be proved to demonstration by the simple process of taking, say, Hugo and Verlaine on the one hand, Delille or Escouchard Lebrun on the other, and comparing the two first mentioned with each other and with the older poet. The differences in the first case will be found to be differences at most of individuality: in the other of kind. We shall not, therefore, further refer to these dubious classifications: but specify briefly the most remarkable poets whom they concern, and all the older of whom, it may be observed, were represented in the _Parnasse_ itself. Of these the most remarkable were Sully Prudhomme (1839-1907), François Coppée (1842-1908) and Paul Verlaine (1844-1896). The first (_Stances et poèmes_, 1865, _Vaines Tendresses_, 1875, _Bonheur_, 1888, &c.) is a philosophical and rather pessimistic poet who has very strongly rallied the suffrages of the rather large present public who care for the embodiment of these tendencies in verse; the second (_La Grève des forgerons_, 1869, _Les Humbles_, 1872, _Contes et vers_, 1881-1887, &c.) a dealer with more generally popular subjects in a more sentimental manner; and the third (_Sagesse_, 1881, _Parallèlement_, 1889, _Poèmes saturniens_, including early work, 1867-1890), by far the most original and remarkable poet of the three, starting with Baudelaire and pushing farther the fancy for forbidden subjects, but treating both these and others with wonderful command of sound and image-suggestion. Verlaine in fact (he was actually well acquainted with English) endeavoured, and to a small extent succeeded in the endeavour, to communicate to French the vague suggestion of visual and audible appeal which has characterized English poetry from Blake through Coleridge. Others of the original Parnassiens who deserve mention are Albert Glatigny (1839-1873), a Bohemian poet of great talent who died young; Stéphane Mallarmé (1842-1898), afterwards chief of the Symbolists, also a true poet in his way, but somewhat barren, and the victim of pose and trick; José Maria de Heredia (1842-1905), a very exquisite practitioner of the sonnet but with perhaps more art than matter in him; Henri Cazalis (1840-1909), who long afterwards, under his name of Jean Lahor, appeared as a Symbolist pessimist; A. Villiers de l'Isle-Adam, another eccentric but with a spark of genius; Emmanuel des Essarts; Auguste de Châtillon (1810-1882); Léon Dierx (b. 1838) who, after producing even less than Mallarmé, succeeded him as Symbolist chief; Jean Aicard (b. 1848), a southern bard of merit; and lastly Catulle Mendès himself, who has been a brilliant writer in verse and prose ever since, and whose _Mouvement poétique français de 1867 à 1900_ (1903), an official report largely amplified so that it is in fact a history and dictionary of French poetry during the century, forms an almost unique work of reference on the subject. Among the later recruits the most specially noticeable was Armand Silvestre (1837-1901), whose verse (_La Chanson des heures_, 1878, _Ailes d'or_, 1880, _La Chanson des étoiles_, 1885), of an ethereal beauty, was contrasted with prose admirably written and sometimes most amusing, but "Pantagruelist," and more, in manners and morals. This declension from poetry to prose fiction was also noticeable in Guy de Maupassant, André Theuriet, Anatole France and even Alphonse Daudet. Entry: _1789
Kant's transcendental teaching is summarily as follows: "Transcendental" is his epithet for what is neither empirical--i.e. to be derived from experience--nor yet transcendent--i.e. applicable beyond the limits of experience, the mark of experience being the implication of sense or of something which thought contra-distinguishes from its own spontaneous activity as in some sense "the given." Those features in our organized experience are to be regarded as transcendentally established which are the presuppositions of our having that experience at all. Since they are not empirical they must be structural and belong to "the mind"--i.e. the normal human intelligence, and to like intelligence so far as like. If we set aside such transcendental conditions as belong to sensibility or to the receptive phase of mind and are the presuppositions of juxtaposition of parts, the remainder are ascribable to spontaneity or understanding, to thought with its unifying, organizing or focussing function, and their elucidation is the problem of transcendental analytic. It is still logic, indeed, when we are occupied with the transcendent objects of the discursive faculty as it is employed beyond the limits of experience where it cannot validate its ideas. Such a logic, however, is a dialectic of illusion, perplexed by paralogisms and helpless in the face of antinomies. In transcendental analytic on the other hand we concern ourselves only with the transcendental "deduction" or vindication of the conditions of experience, and we have a logic of cognition in which we may establish our epistemological categories with complete validity. Categories are the forms according to which the combining unity of self-consciousness (synthetic unity of apperception) pluralizes itself through the various functions involved in the constitution of objectivity in different types of the one act of thought, viz. judgment. The clue to the discovery of transcendental conditions Kant finds in the existence of judgments, most manifest in mathematics and in the pure science of nature, which are certain, yet not trifling, necessary and yet not reducible to identities, synthetic therefore and a priori, and so accounted for neither by Locke nor by Leibnitz. "There lies a transcendental condition at the basis of every necessity." Entry: A
Hegel's treatment of the categories or thought determinations which arise in the development of the immanent dialectic is rich in flashes of insight, but most of them are in the ordinary view of logic wholly metaphysical. In the stage, however, of his process in which he is concerned with the notion are to be found concept, judgment, syllogism. Of the last he declares that it "is the reasonable and everything reasonable" (_Encyk._ § 181), and has the phantasy to speak of the definition of the Absolute as being "at this stage" simply the syllogism. It is, of course, the rhythm of the syllogism that attracts him. The concept goes out from or utters itself in judgment to return to an enhanced unity in syllogism. Ueberweg (_System_ § 101) is, on the whole, justified in exclaiming that Hegel's rehabilitation of syllogism "did but slight service to the Aristotelian theory of syllogism," yet his treatment of syllogism must be regarded as an acute contribution to logical criticism in the technical sense. He insists on its objectivity. The transition from judgment is not brought about by our subjective action. The syllogism of "all-ness" is convicted of a _petitio principii_ (_Encyk._ § 190), with consequent lapse into the inductive syllogism, and, finally, since inductive syllogism is involved in the infinite process, into analogy. "The syllogism of necessity," on the contrary, does not presuppose its conclusion in its premises. The detail, too, of the whole discussion is rich in suggestion, and subsequent logicians--Ueberweg himself perhaps, Lotze certainly in his genetic scale of types of judgment and inference, Professor Bosanquet notably in his systematic development of "the morphology of knowledge," and others--have with reason exploited it. Entry: A
Lotze on the one hand held the Hegelian "deduction" to be untenable, and classed himself with those who in his own phrase "passed to the order of the day," while on the other hand he definitely raised the question, how an "object" could be brought into forms to which it was not in some sense adapted. Accordingly, though he regards logic as formal, its forms come into relation to objectivity in some sort even within the logical field itself, while when taken in the setting of his system as a whole, its formal character is not of a kind that ultimately excludes psychological and metaphysical reference, at least speculatively. As a logician Lotze stands among the masters. His _flair_ for the essentials in his problem, his subtlety of analysis, his patient willingness to return upon a difficulty from a fresh and still a fresh point of view, and finally his fineness of judgment, make his logic[137] so essentially logic of the present, and of its kind not soon to be superseded, that nothing more than an indication of the historical significance of some of its characteristic features need be attempted here. Entry: A
FROMMEL, GASTON (1862-1906), Swiss theologian, professor of theology in the university of Geneva from 1894 to 1906. An Alsatian by birth, he belonged mainly to French Switzerland, where he spent most of his life. He may best be described as continuing the spirit of Vinet (q.v.) amid the mental conditions marking the end of the 19th century. Like Vinet, he derived his philosophy of religion from a peculiarly deep experience of the Gospel of Christ as meeting the demands of the moral consciousness; but he developed even further than Vinet the psychological analysis of conscience and the method of verifying every doctrine by direct reference to spiritual experience. Both made much of moral individuality or personality as the crown and criterion of reality, believing that its correlation with Christianity, both historically and philosophically, was most intimate. But while Vinet laid most stress on the liberty from human authority essential to the moral consciousness, the changed needs of the age caused Frommel to develop rather the aspect of man's dependence as a moral being upon God's spiritual initiative, "the conditional nature of his liberty." "Liberty is not the primary, but the secondary characteristic" of conscience; "before being free, it is the subject of obligation." On this depends its objectivity as a real revelation of the Divine Will. Thus he claimed that a deeper analysis carried one beyond the human subjectivity of even Kant's categorical imperative, since consciousness of obligation was "une expérience imposée sous le mode de l'absolu." By his use of _imposée_ Frommel emphasized the priority of man's sense of obligation to his consciousness either of self or of God. Here he appealed to the current psychology of the subconscious for confirmation of his analysis, by which he claimed to transcend mere intellectualism. In his language on this fundamental point he was perhaps too jealous of admitting an ideal element as implicit in the feeling of obligation. Still he did well in insisting on priority to self-conscious thought as a mark of metaphysical objectivity in the case of moral, no less than of physical experience. Further, he found in the Christian revelation the same characteristics as belonged to the universal revelation involved in conscience, viz. God's sovereign initiative and his living action in history. From this standpoint he argued against a purely psychological type of religion (_agnosticisme religieux_, as he termed it)--a tendency to which he saw even in A. Sabatier and the _symbolo-fidéisme_ of the Paris School--as giving up a real and unifying faith. His influence on men, especially the student class, was greatly enhanced by the religious force and charm of his personality. Finally, like Vinet, he was a man of letters and a penetrating critic of men and systems. Entry: FROMMEL
DREAM (from a root _dreug_, connected with Germ. _trügen_, to deceive), the state of consciousness during sleep; it may also be defined as a hallucination or illusion peculiarly associated with the condition of sleep, but not necessarily confined to that state. In sleep the withdrawal of the mind from the external world is more complete and the objectivity of the dream images is usually unquestioned, whereas in the waking state the hallucination is usually recognized as such; we may, however, be conscious that we are dreaming, and thus in a measure be aware of the hallucinatory character of our percepts. The physiological nature of sleep (q.v.; see also MUSCLE AND NERVE) and of dreaming is obscure. As a rule the control over the voluntary muscles in dreams is slight; the sleep-walker is the exception and not the rule, and the motor activity represented in the dream is seldom realized in practice, largely, no doubt, because we are ignorant, under these circumstances, of the spatial relations of our bodies. Among the psychological problems raised by dreams are the condition of attention, which is variously regarded as altogether absent or as fixed, the extent of mental control, and the relation of ideas and motor impulses. There is present in all dreams a certain amount of dissociation of consciousness, or of obstructed association, which may manifest itself in the preliminary stage of drowsiness by such phenomena as the apparent transformation or inversion of the words of a book. We may distinguish two types of dreams, (a) representative or centrally initiated, (b) presentative or due to the stimulation of the end organs of sense. In both cases, the dream having once been initiated, we are concerned with a process of reasoning, i.e. the combination of ideas suggested by resemblances or other associative elements. The false reasoning of dreams is due in the first place to the absence, to a large extent, of the memory elements on which our ordinary reasoning depends, and, secondly, to the absence of sensory elements. Entry: DREAM