Everyday experience familiarizes us with the facts which are grouped under the name of heredity. Every one of us bears upon him obvious marks of his parentage, perhaps of remoter relationships. More particularly, the sum of tendencies to act in a certain, way, which we call "character," is often to be traced through a long series of progenitors and collaterals. So we may justly say that this "character"--this moral and intellectual essence of a man--does veritably pass over from one fleshy tabernacle to another, ana does really transmigrate from generation to generation. In the new-born infant the character of the stock lies latent, and the Ego is little more than a bundle of potentialities. But, very early, these become actualities; from childhood to age they manifest themselves in dulness or brightness, weakness or strength, viciousness or uprightness; and with each feature modified by confluence with another character, if by nothing else, the character passes on to its incarnation in new bodies.
A noteworthy feature is the frequent _personification_ of peoples, tribes or clans (see GENEALOGY: _Biblical_). Midian (i.e. the Midianites) is a son of Abraham; Canaan is a son of Ham (ix. 22), and Cush the son of Ham is the father of Ramah and grandfather of the famous S. Arabian state Sheba and the traders of Dedan (x. 6 sq., cf. Ezek. xxvii. 20-22). Bethuel the father of Rebekah is the brother of the tribal names Uz and Buz (xxii. 21 sqq., cf. Jer. xxv. 20, 23). Jacob is otherwise known as Israel and becomes the father of the tribes of Israel; Joseph is the father of Ephraim and Manasseh, and incidents in the life of Judah lead to the birth of Perez and Zerah, Judaean clans. This personification is entirely natural to the Oriental, and though "primitive" is not necessarily an ancient trait.[19] It gives rise to what may be termed the "prophetical interpretation of history" (S.R. Driver, _Genesis_, p. 111), where the character, fortunes or history of the apparent individual are practically descriptive of the people or tribe which, according to tradition, is named after or descended from him. The utterance of Noah over Canaan, Shem and Japheth (ix. 25 sqq.), of Isaac over Esau and Jacob (xxvii.), of Jacob over his sons (xlix.) or grandsons (xlviii.), would have no meaning to Israelites unless they had some connexion with and interest for contemporary life and thought. Herein lies the force of the description of the wild and independent Ishmael (xvi. 12), the "father" of certain well-known tribes (xxv. 13-15); or the contrast between the skilful hunter Esau and the quiet and respectable Jacob (xxv. 27), and between the tiller Cain who becomes the typical nomad and the pastoral Abel (iv. 1-15). The interest of the struggles between Jacob and Esau lay, not in the history of individuals of the distant past, but in the fact that the names actually represented Israel and its near rival Edom. These features are in entire accordance with Oriental usage and give expression to current belief, existing relationships, or to a poetical foreshadowing of historical vicissitudes. But in the effort to understand them as they were originally understood it is very obvious that this method of interpretation can be pressed too far. It would be precarious to insist that the entrances into Palestine of Abraham and Jacob (or Israel) typified two distinct immigrations. The separation of Abraham from Lot (cf. Lotan, an Edomite name), of Isaac from Hagar-Ishmael, or of Jacob from Esau-Edom scarcely points to the relative antiquity of the origin of these non-Israelite peoples who, to judge from the evidence, were closely related. Or, if the "sons" of Jacob had Aramaean mothers, to prove that those which are derived from the wives were upon a higher level than the "sons" of the concubines is more difficult than to allow that certain of the tribes must have contained some element of Aramaean blood (cf. 1 Chron. vii. 14, and see ASHER; GAD; MANASSEH). Some of the names are clearly not those of known clans or tribes (e.g. Abraham, Isaac), and many of the details of the narratives obviously have no natural ethnological meaning. Stories of heroic ancestors and of tribal eponyms intermingle; personal, tribal and national traits are interwoven. The entrance of Jacob or Israel with his sons suggests that of the children of Israel. The story of Simeon and Levi at Shechem is clearly not that of two individuals, sons of the patriarch Israel; in fact the story actually uses the term "wrought folly in Israel" (cf. Jud. xx. 6, 10), and the individual Shechem, the son of Hamor, cannot be separated from the city, the scene of the incidents. Yet Jacob's life with Laban has many purely individual traits. And, further, there intervenes a remarkable passage with an account of his conflict with the divine being who fears the dawn and is unwilling to reveal his name. In a few verses the "wrestling" ('-b -k) of Jacob (_ya'aqob_) is associated with the Jabbok (_yabboq_); his "striving" explains his name Israel; at Peniel he sees "the face of God," and when touched on his vulnerable spot--the hollow of the thigh--he is lamed, hence "the children of Israel eat not the sinew of the hip which is upon the hollow of the thigh unto this day" (xxxii. 24-32). Other examples of the fusion of different features can be readily found. Three divine beings appear to Abraham at the sacred tree of Hebron, and when the birth of Isaac (from _sahaq_, "laugh") is foretold, the account of Sarah's behaviour is merely a popular and trivial story suggested by the child's name (xviii. 12-15; see also xvii. 17, xxi. 6, 9). An extremely fine passage then describes the patriarch's intercession for Sodom and Gomorrah, and the narrative passes on to the catastrophe which explains the Dead Sea and its desert region and has parallels elsewhere (e.g. the Greek legend of Zeus and Hermes in Phrygia). Lot escapes to Zoar, the name gives rise to the pun on the "little" city (xix. 20), and his wife, on looking back, becomes one of those pillars of salt which still invite speculation. Finally the names of his children Moab and Ammon are explained by an incident when he is a cave-dweller on a mountain. Entry: A
It is in the first place desirable to distinguish between the word "instinct" (Lat. _instinctus_, from _instinguere_, to incite, impel) as employed in general literature and the term "instinct" as used in scientific discourse. The significance of the former is somewhat elastic, and is in large measure determined by the context. Thus in social relationships we speak of "instinctive" liking or distrust; we are told that the Greeks had "instinctive" appreciation of art; we hear of an instinct of reverence or "instinctive" beliefs. We understand what is meant and neither desire nor demand a strict definition. But in any scientific discussion the term instinct must be used within narrower limits, and hence it is necessary that the term should be defined. There are difficulties, however, in framing a satisfactory definition. That given by G. J. Romanes in the 9th edition of the _Encyclopaedia Britannica_ runs as follows: "Instinct is a generic term comprising all those faculties of mind which lead to the conscious performance of actions that are adaptive in character but pursued without necessary knowledge of the relation between the means employed and the ends attained." This has been criticized both from the biological and from the psychological standpoint. From the biological point of view the reference of certain modes of behaviour, termed instinctive, to faculties of mind for which "instinct" is the generic term is scarcely satisfactory; from the psychological point of view the phrase "without necessary knowledge of the relation between the means employed and the end attained" is ambiguous. (See INTELLIGENCE OF ANIMALS.) In recent scientific literature the term is more frequently used in its adjectival than in its substantive form; and the term "instinctive" is generally applied to certain hereditary modes of behaviour. Investigation thus becomes more objective, and this is a distinct advantage from the biological point of view. It is indeed sometimes urged that instinctive modes of behaviour should be so defined as to entirely exclude any reference to their psychological concomitants in consciousness, which are, it is said, entirely inferential. But as a matter of fact no small part of the interest and value of investigations in this field of inquiry lies in the relationships which may thereby be established between biological and psychological interpretations. Fully realizing, therefore, the difficulty of finding and applying a criterion of the presence or absence of consciousness, it is none the less desirable, in the interests of psychology, to state that truly instinctive acts (as defined) are accompanied by consciousness. This marks them off from such reflex acts as are unconsciously performed, and from the tropisms of plants and other lowly organisms. There remains, however, the difficulty of finding any satisfactory criterion of the presence of consciousness. We seem forced to accept a practical criterion for purposes of interpretation rather than one which can be theoretically defended against all adverse criticism. We have reason to believe that some organisms profit by experience and show that they do so by the modification of their behaviour in accordance with circumstances. Such modification is said to be individually acquired. To profit by individual experience is thus the only criterion we possess of the existence of the conscious experience itself. But if hereditary behaviour is unaccompanied by consciousness, it can in no wise contribute to experience, and can afford no data by which the organism can profit. Hence, for purposes of psychological interpretation it seems necessary to assume that instinctive behaviour, including the stimulation by which it is initiated and conditioned, affords that naive awareness which forms an integral part of what may be termed the primordial tissue of experience. Entry: INSTINCT