I have gained this by philosophy: that I do without being commanded what others do only from fear of the law.
The earth was unintelligible to the ancients because looked upon as a solitary being, without a peer in the whole universe; but it assumed a new and true significance as soon as it rose before the eyes of man as one of many planets, all governed by the same laws, and all revolving around the same centre. It is the same with the human soul, and its nature stands before our mind in quite a different light since man has been taught to know and feel himself as a member of a great family--as one of the myriads of wandering stars all governed by the same laws, and all revolving around the same centre, and all deriving their light from the same source. 'Universal History' has laid open new avenues of thought, and it has enriched our language with a word which never passed the lips of Socrates, or Plato, or Aristotle--_Mankind_. Where the Greek saw barbarians, we see brethren; where the Greek saw nations, we see mankind, toiling and suffering, separated by oceans, divided by language, and severed by national enmity,--yet evermore tending, under a divine control, towards the fulfilment of that inscrutable purpose for which the world was created, and man placed in it, bearing the image of God. History therefore, with its dusty and mouldering pages, is to us as sacred a volume as the book of nature. In both we read, or we try to read, the reflex of the laws and thoughts of a Divine Wisdom. We believe that there is nothing irrational in either history or nature, and that the human mind is called upon to read and to revere in both the manifestations of a Divine Power.
Man perfected by society is the best of all animals; he is the most terrible of all when he lives without law and without justice.
Even when laws have been written down, they ought not always to remain unaltered.
I have gained this by philosophy: that I do without being commanded what others do only from fear of the law. -- Aristotle</p>
5. The court in the precincts of the Prytaneum, to the north of the Acropolis, was only of ceremonial importance. It "solemnly heard and condemned undiscovered murderers, and animals or inanimate objects that had caused the loss of life."[2] The writ ran "against the doer of the deed," and any instrument of death that was found guilty was thrown across the frontier. The trial was held by the four "tribe-kings" ([Greek: phylobasileis]), an archaic survival from before the time of Cleisthenes. (On these five courts see Aristotle's _Constitution of Athens_, c. 57, and Dem. _Aristocr._ 65-79.) Entry: 5
This brings us to another source of error. As we have seen, Jevons, Sigwart and Wundt all think that induction contains a belief in causation, in a cause, or ground, which is not present in the particular facts of experience, but is contributed by a hypothesis added as a major premise to the particulars in order to explain them by the cause or ground. Not so; when an induction is causal, the particular instances are already beliefs in particular causes, e.g. "My right hand is exerting pressure reciprocally with my left," "A, B, C magnets attract iron"; and the problem is to generalize these causes, not to introduce them. Induction is not introduction. It would make no difference to the form of induction, if, as Kant thought, the notion of causality is a priori; for even Kant thought that it is already contained in experience. But whether Kant be right or wrong, Wundt and his school are decidedly wrong in supposing "supplementary notions which are not contained in experience itself, but are gained by a process of logical treatment of this experience"; as if our behalf in causality could be neither a posteriori nor a priori, but beyond experience wake up in a hypothetical major premise of induction. Really, we first experience that particular causes have particular effects; then induce that causes similar to those have effects similar to these; finally, deduce that when a particular cause of the kind occurs it has a particular effect of the kind by synthetic deduction, and that when a particular effect of the kind occurs it has a particular cause of the kind by analytic deduction with a convertible premise, as when Newton from planetary motions, like terrestrial motions, analytically deduced a centripetal force to the sun like centripetal forces to the earth. Moreover, causal induction is itself both synthetic and analytic: according as experiment combines elements into a compound, or resolves a compound into elements, it is the origin of a synthetic or an analytic generalization. Not, however, that all induction is causal; but where it is not, there is still less reason for making it a deduction from hypothesis. When from the fact that the many crows in our experience are black, we induce the probability that all crows whatever are black, the belief in the particulars is quite independent of this universal. How then can this universal be called, as Sigwart, for example, calls it, the ground from which these particulars follow? I do not believe that the crows I have seen are black because all crows are black, but vice versa. Sigwart simply inverts the order of our knowledge. In all induction, as Aristotle said, the particulars are the evidence, or ground of our knowledge (_principium cognoscendi_), of the universal. In causal induction, the particulars further contain the cause, or ground of the being (_principium essendi_), of the effect, as well as the ground of our inducing the law. In all induction the universal is the conclusion, in none a major premise, and in none the ground of either the being or the knowing of the particulars. Induction is generalization. It is not syllogism in the form of Aristotle's or Wundt's inductive syllogism, because, though starting only from some particulars, it concludes with a universal; it is not syllogism in the form called inverse deduction by Jevons, reduction by Sigwart, inductive method by Wundt, because it often uses particular facts of causation to infer universal laws of causation; it is not syllogism in the form of Mill's syllogism from a belief in uniformity of nature, because few men have believed in uniformity, but all have induced from particulars to universals. Bacon alone was right in altogether opposing induction to syllogism, and in finding inductive rules for the inductive process from particular instances of presence, absence in similar circumstances, and comparison. Entry: 1
In 1856 Grote began to prepare his works on Plato and Aristotle. _Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates_ (3 vols.) appeared in 1865, but the work on Aristotle he was not destined to complete. He had finished the _Organon_ and was about to deal with the metaphysical and physical treatises when he died on the 18th of June 1871, and was buried in Westminster Abbey. He was a man of strong character and self-control, unfailing courtesy and unswerving devotion to what he considered the best interests of the nation. To colleagues and subordinates alike, he was considerate and tolerant; he was unassuming, trustworthy in the smallest detail, accurate and comprehensive in thought, energetic and conscientious in action. Yet, hidden under his calm exterior there was a burning enthusiasm and a depth of passion of which only his intimate friends were aware. Entry: GROTE
EPHEBI (Gr. [Greek: epi], and [Greek: hêbê], i.e. "those who have reached puberty"), a name specially given, in Athens and other Greek towns, to a class of young men from eighteen to twenty years of age, who formed a sort of college under state control. On the completion of his seventeenth year the Athenian youth attained his civil majority, and, provided he belonged to the first three property classes and passed the scrutiny ([Greek: dokimasia]) as to age, civic descent and physical capability, was enrolled on the register of his deme ([Greek: lêxiarchikon grammateion]). He thereby at once became liable to the military training and duties, which, at least in the earliest times, were the main object of the Ephebia. In the time of Aristotle the names of the enrolled ephebi were engraved on a bronze pillar (formerly on wooden tablets) in front of the council-chamber. After admission to the college, the ephebus took the oath of allegiance, recorded in Pollux and Stobaeus (but not in Aristotle), in the temple of Aglaurus, and was sent to Munychia or Acte to form one of the garrison. At the end of the first year of training, the ephebi were reviewed, and, if their performance was satisfactory, were provided by the state with a spear and a shield, which, together with the _chlamys_ (cloak) and _petasus_ (broad-brimmed hat), made up their equipment. In their second year they were transferred to other garrisons in Attica, patrolled the frontiers, and on occasion took an active part in war. During these two years they were free from taxation, and were not allowed (except in certain cases) to appear in the law courts as plaintiffs or defendants. The ephebi took part in some of the most important Athenian festivals. Thus during the Eleusinia they were told off to fetch the sacred objects from Eleusis and to escort the image of Iacchus on the sacred way. They also performed police duty at the meetings of the ecclesia. Entry: EPHEBI
The most important element, then, of well-being or good life for ordinary men Aristotle holds to consist in well-doing as determined by the notions of the different moral excellences. In expounding these, he gives throughout the pure result of analytical observation of the common moral consciousness of his age. Ethical truth, in his view, is to be attained by careful comparison of particular moral opinions, just as physical truth is to be obtained by induction from particular physical observations. On account of the conflict of opinion in ethics we cannot hope to obtain certainty upon all questions; still reflection will lead us to discard some of the conflicting views and find a reconciliation for others, and will furnish, on the whole, a practically sufficient residuum of moral truth. This adhesion to common sense, though it involves a sacrifice of both depth and completeness in Aristotle's system, gives at the same time an historical interest which renders it deserving of special attention as an analysis of the current Greek ideal of "fair and good life" ([Greek: kalokágathia]). His virtues are not arranged on any clear philosophic plan; the list shows no serious attempt to consider human life exhaustively, and exhibit the standard of excellence appropriate to its different departments or aspects. He seems to have taken as a starting-point Plato's four cardinal virtues. The two comprehensive notions of Wisdom and Justice ([Greek: dikaiosunê]) he treats separately. As regards both his analysis leads him to diverge considerably from Plato. As we saw, his distinction between practical and speculative Wisdom belongs to the deepest of his disagreements with his master; and in the case of [Greek: dikaiosunê] again he distinguishes the wider use of the term to express Law-observance, which (he says) coincides with the social side of virtue generally, and its narrower use for the virtue that "aims at a kind of equality," whether (1) in the distribution of wealth, honour, &c., or (2) in commercial exchange, or (3) in the reparation of wrong done. Then, in arranging the other special virtues, he begins with courage and temperance, which (after Plato) he considers as the excellences of the "irrational element" of the soul. Next follow two pairs of excellences, concerned respectively with wealth and honour: (1) liberality and magnificence, of which the latter is exhibited in greater matters of expenditure, and (2) laudable ambition and highmindedness similarly related to honour. Then comes gentleness--the virtue regulative of anger; and the list is concluded by the excellences of social intercourse, friendliness (as a mean between obsequiousness and surliness), truthfulness and decorous wit. Entry: A
The greatest political writer of the age is Jean Bodin (1530-1596), whose _République_ is founded partly on speculative considerations like the political theories of the ancients, and partly on an extended historical inquiry. Bodin, like most lawyers who have taken the royalist side, is for unlimited monarchy, but notwithstanding this, he condemns religious persecution and discourages slavery. In his speculations on the connexion between forms of government and natural causes, he serves as a link between Aristotle and Montesquieu. On the other hand, the causes which we have mentioned made a large number of writers adopt opposite conclusions. Étienne de la Boétie (1530-1563), the friend of Montaigne's youth, composed the _Contre un or Discours de la servitude volontaire_, a protest against the monarchical theory. The boldness of the protest and the affectionate admiration of Montaigne have given la Boétie a much higher reputation than any extant work of his actually deserves. The _Contre un_ is a kind of prize essay, full of empty declamation borrowed from the ancients, and showing no grasp of the practical conditions of politics. Not much more historically based, but far more vigorous and original, is the _Franco-Gallia_ of François Hotmann (1524-1590), a work which appeared both in Latin and French, which extols the authority of the states-general, represents them as direct successors of the political institutions of Gauls and Franks, and maintains the right of insurrection. In the last quarter of the century political animosity knew no bounds. The Protestants beheld a divine instrument in Poltrot de Méré, the Catholics in Jacques Clément. The Latin treatises of Hubert Languet (1518-1581) and Buchanan formally vindicated--the first, like Hotmann, the right of rebellion based on an original contract between prince and people, the second the right of tyrannicide. Indeed, as Montaigne confesses, divine authorization for political violence was claimed and denied by both parties according as the possession or the expectancy of power belonged to each, and the excesses of the preachers and pamphleteers knew no bounds. Entry: D
The scope of the arts was wider than their names would suggest in modern times. Under grammar was included the study of the content and form of literature; and in practice the teaching varied from a liberal literary culture to a dry and perfunctory study of just enough grammar to give some facility in the use of Latin. Dialectic was mainly formal logic. Rhetoric covered the study of law, as well as composition in prose and verse. Geometry was rather what is now understood by geography and natural history, together with the medicinal properties of plants. Arithmetic, with the cumbrous Roman notation, included little more than the simplest practical calculations required in ordinary life and the computation of the calendar. Music embraced the rules of the plain-song of the Church, some theory of sound, and the connexion of harmony and numbers. Astronomy dealt with the courses of the heavenly bodies, and was seldom kept free from astrology. In philosophy the current text-books were the _De consolatione philosophiae_ of Boethius (470-524), an eclectic summary of pagan ethics from the standpoint of the Christian view of life, and the same writer's adapted translations of the _Categories_ and _De interpretatione_ of Aristotle and of Porphyry's _Introduction to the Categories_. Entry: I
FALLACY (Lat. _fall-ax_, apt to mislead), the term given generally to any mistaken statement used in argument; in Logic, technically, an argument which violates the laws of correct demonstration. An argument may be fallacious in _matter_ (i.e. misstatement of facts), in _wording_ (i.e. wrong use of words), or in the _process of inference_. Fallacies have, therefore, been classified as: I. Material, II. Verbal, III. Logical Of Formal; II. and III. are often included under the general description _Logical_, and in scholastic phraseology, following Aristotle, are called fallacies _in dictione_ or _in voce_, as opposed to material fallacies _in re_ or _extra dictionem_. Entry: FALLACY
In this aspect Christianity invites comparison with Stoicism, and indeed with pagan ethical philosophy generally, if we except the hedonistic schools. Rightness of purpose, preference of virtue for its own sake, suppression of vicious desires, were made essential points by the Aristotelians, who attached the most importance to outward circumstances in their view of virtue, no less than by the Stoics, to whom all outward things were indifferent. The fundamental differences between pagan and Christian ethics depend not on any difference in the value set on rightness of heart, but on different views of the essential form or conditions of this inward rightness. In neither case is it presented purely and simply as moral rectitude. By the pagan philosophers it was always conceived under the form of Knowledge or Wisdom, it being inconceivable to all the schools sprung from Socrates that a man could truly know his own good and yet deliberately choose anything else. This knowledge, as Aristotle held, might be permanently precluded by vicious habits, or temporarily obliterated by passion, but if present in the mind it must produce rightness of purpose. Or even if it were held with some of the Stoics that true wisdom was out of the reach of the best men actually living, it none the less remained the ideal condition of perfect human life. By Christian teachers, on the other hand, the inner springs of good conduct were generally conceived as Faith and Love. Of these notions the former has a somewhat complex ethical import; it seems to blend several elements differently prominent in different minds. Its simplest and commonest meaning is that emphasized in the contrast of "faith" with "sight"; where it signifies belief in the invisible divine order represented by the church, in the actuality of the law, the threats, the promises of God, in spite of all the influences in man's natural life that tend to obscure this belief. Out of this contrast there ultimately grew an essentially different opposition between faith and knowledge or reason, according to which the theological basis of ethics was contrasted with the philosophical; the theologians maintaining sometimes that the divine law is essentially arbitrary, the expression of will, not reason; more frequently that its reasonableness is inscrutable, and that actual human reason should confine itself to examining the credentials of God's messengers, and not the message itself. But in early Christianity this latter antithesis was as yet undeveloped; faith means simply force in clinging to moral and religious conviction, whatever their rational grounds may be; this force, in the Christian consciousness, being inseparably bound up with personal loyalty and trust towards Christ, the leader in the battle with evil, the ruler of the kingdom to be realized. So far, however, there is no ethical difference between Christian faith and that of Judaism, or its later imitation, Mahommedanism; except that the personal affection of loyal trust is peculiarly stirred by the blending of human and divine natures in Christ, and the rule of duty impressively taught by the manifestation of his perfect life. A more distinctively Christian, and a more deeply moral, significance is given to the notion in the antithesis of "faith" and "works." Here faith means more than loyal acceptance of the divine law and reverent trust in the lawgiver; it implies a consciousness, at once continually present and continually transcended, of the radical imperfection of all human obedience to the law, and at the same time of the irremissible condemnation which this imperfection entails. The Stoic doctrine of the worthlessness of ordinary human virtue, and the stern paradox that all offenders are equally, in so far as all are absolutely, guilty, find their counterparts in Christianity; but the latter (maintaining this ideal severity in the moral standard, with an emotional consciousness of what is involved in it quite unlike that of the Stoic) overcomes its practical exclusiveness through faith. This faith, again, may be conceived in two modes, essentially distinct though usually combined. In one view it gives the believer strength to attain, by God's supernatural aid or "grace," a goodness of which he is naturally incapable; in the other view it gives him an assurance that, though he knows himself a sinner deserving of utter condemnation, a perfectly just God still regards him with favour on account of the perfect services and suffering of Christ. Of these views the former is the more catholic, more universally present in the Christian consciousness; the latter more deeply penetrates the mystery of the Atonement, as expounded in the Pauline epistles. Entry: B
For some time, especially in Germany, this constitution was almost universally accepted; now, the majority of scholars reject it. The reasons against it, which are almost overwhelming, may be shortly summarized. (1) It is ignored by every other ancient authority, except an admittedly spurious passage in Plato[1]; whereas Aristotle says of his laws "they are laws, but he _added the laws to an existing constitution_" (Pol. ii. 9. 9). (2) It is inconsistent with other passages in the _Constitution of Athens_. According to c. vii., Solon repealed all laws of Draco except those relating to murder; yet some of the most modern features of Solon's constitution are found in Draco's constitution. (3) Its ideas are alien to the 7th century. It has been said that the qualification of the strategus was ten times that of the archon. This, reasonable in the 5th, is preposterous in the 7th century, when the archon was unquestionably the supreme executive official. Again, it is unlikely that Solon, a democratic reformer, would have reverted from a democratic wealth' qualification such as is attributed to Draco, to an aristocratic birth qualification. Thirdly, if Draco had instituted a hoplite census, Solon would not have substituted citizenship by birth. (4) The terminology of Draco's constitution is that of the 5th, not the 7th, century, whereas the chief difficulty of Solon's laws is the obsolete 6th-century phraseology. (5) Lastly, a comparison between the ideals of the oligarchs under Theramenes (end of 5th century) and this alleged constitution shows a suspicious similarity (hoplite census, nobody to hold office a second time until all duly qualified persons had been exhausted, fine of one drachma for non-attendance in Boul[=e]). It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the constitution of Draco was invented by the school of Theramenes, who wished to surround their revolutionary views with the halo of antiquity; hence the allusion to "the constitution of our father" ([Greek: hê patrios politeia]). Entry: DRACO
The precise powers which Solon gave the people are not known. It is clear that the executive power in the state (see ARCHON) was still vested in the Eupatrid class. It is obvious, therefore, that a moderate reformer would endeavour to give to the people some control over the magistracy. Now in speaking of the Thetes (the lowest of the four Solonian classes; see SOLON), Aristotle's _Constitution of Athens_ says that Solon gave them merely "a share in the Ecclesia and the Law Courts," and in the _Politics_ we find that he gave them the right of electing the magistrates and receiving their accounts at the end of the official year. Thus it seems that the "mixed" character of Solon's constitution consisted in the fact that though the officials of the state were still necessarily Eupatrid, the Ecclesia elected those of the Eupatrids whom they could trust, and further had the right of criticizing their official actions. Secondly, all our accounts agree that Solon admitted the Thetes to the Ecclesia, thus recognizing them as citizens. Under Cleisthenes the Ecclesia remained the sovereign power, but the Council seems to have become to some extent a separate administrative body. The relation of Boule and Ecclesia in the Cleisthenic democracy was of the greatest importance. The Ecclesia alone, a heterogeneous body of untrained citizens, could not have passed, nor even have drawn up intelligible measures; all the preliminary drafting was done by the small committee of the Boule which was in session at any particular time. In the 5th century the functions of the Ecclesia and the popular courts of justice were vastly increased by the exigencies of empire. At the beginning of the 4th century B.C. the system of payment was introduced (see below). In 308 B.C. Demetrius of Phalerum curtailed the power of the Ecclesia by the institution of the _Nomophylaces_ (Guardians of the Law), who prevented the Ecclesia from voting on an illegal or injurious motion. Under Roman rule the powers of the Ecclesia and the popular courts were much diminished, and after 48 B.C. (the franchise being frequently sold to any casual alien) the Demos (people) was of no importance. They still assembled to pass psephisms in the theatre and to elect strategi, and, under Hadrian, had some small judicial duties, but as a governing body the Ecclesia died when Athens became a _civitas libera_ under Roman protection. Entry: ECCLESIA